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to insist on such a clause,"6 the management lawyer should bargain
for as broad a prerogative clause as possible.
Louis Sweetland Southworth, II

Products Liability-Delegation of Duties by Manufacturers of
Inherently Dangerous Products
P, the purchaser and user of a hot water heater, manufactured
by D1, instituted an action against D1 and D9, the contractor who
installed the hot water heater, for the damages arising from its
explosion. When sold, the water heater was accompanied by
installation instructions which specified that a combination temperature and pressure valve must be used on the hot water line. These
instructions were not followed. The contractor instead followed
the common practice of the plumbing industry and installed only
pressure valves, resulting in the explosion. The lower court dismissed the suit as to Ds and found against D, and then both P and
D, appealed. Held, judgment against D1 reversed. The water
heater was not in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous
to the user when it left the manufacturer, and, in addition, the
water heater was substantially changed when used by P from the
condition in which it was sold. Because D2 failed to install the
correct temperature relief valve he was negligent and this negligence
became the sole proximate cause of the explosion. State Stove Mfg.
Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
This case raises a vital problem existing today in the field of product liability, i.e., to what extent can a manufacturer delegate his
duty to preserve the safety of the consuming public through (1)
inspecting his product, (2) warning as to the safe use of his product or (3) installing additional and necessary safety devices,
and by delegating this responsibility be relieved of liability, when
the product itself is inherently or imminently dangerous?'
56

NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).

1For the purposes of this article it is assumed that privity of contract is
not a requirement for the manufacturer to be held liable. However, West

Virginia would still recog ne the manufacturer's liability since it supports the
exception of imminently dangerous products to the privity rule. General Motors
Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1943) and Peters v. Johnson, Jackson

&Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1901).
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The first type of case involving the delegation of the duty to
inspect the product, for the most part, arises in the appliance and
automobile industries.2 These cases have consistently held that
this duty is non-delegable. ' The Restatement of Torts provides that
one's failure to inspect, which if done could have prevented the
injury, "does not however, relieve from liability the manufacturer
to whose negligence the dangerous condition is due."'
A leading example is Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.' in which
the manufacturer had delegated the final steps in checking the
products to its authorized dealer who neglected to adjust the
brakes, resulting in the injury to the purchaser. The court said,
"since Ford, as the manufacturer of the completed product, cannot
delegate its duty to have its cars delivered to the ultimate purchaser
free from dangerous defects, it cannot escape liability on the
ground that the defect in Vandermark's car may have been caused
by something one of its authorized dealers did or failed to do."6
This case was cited by the dissenting opinion in the principal case,
(after the dissenting judge found that the water heater was not
reasonably safe for the intended use), to support the contention
that the manufacturer had a duty to install the safety device and
that this duty as non-delegable.
Two approaches have been suggested in determining the automobile manufacturer's liability: (1) the manufacturer warrants
that the inherently dangerous products is reasonably safe for use
when it leaves the dealer's service department, or (2) it warrants
that the automobile was reasonably suitable for delivery to the
dealer under the accepted standards of the industry!
2 The automobile has generally been held to be imminently dangerous,
i.e., a product not dangerous in itself but dangerous if negligently made.
Elliott v. General Motors Corp., 296 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1961) and Griffith
v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 105 Ga. App. 588, 125 S.E.2d 525 (1962), as
opposed to inherently dangerous, i.e., dangerous by its yer nature, General
Bronze
Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 122 S.E.2d 548 (1961).
3
Alexander v. Nash-Kelvinator Corp., 261 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1958),
Pierce v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1951) and Birdsong v.
General
Motors Corp., 99 F.Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
4
ESTATEMENT (SEcoND), Tonas § 396, comment b (1965).
a 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, (1964).
6 Id. at 261. For a further discussion with citations to cases involving
other products see 1 Fitaxnm & FRIE1AN, PRODUCT LiABrLF § 11.04 (2)

7
1Miller, Henningsen and the Pre-Delivery Inspection and Conditioning
Schedule, 16 RuTrEas L. REv. 559, 564-565 (1962). This article discusses
the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1961), the successor to the celebrated case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
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The first approach is justifiable on either of two grounds. First,
the court might consider the delegation of this duty to inspect
as analogous to a subcontract for a part of the completed product
and apply the general rule set forth in Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis8
and Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown.' This rule is that the negligence

of the supplier of component parts imposes liability on the manufacturer as if the manufacturer had produced the part himself.
Secondly, the court might consider this delegation as it would the
delegation of any work which, without special precautions, is
certain to be attended with injurious consequences. The rule of law
in this situation is set forth in the case of Law v. Phillips'" which
involved the problem of subcontracting a dangerous excavating job.
The court held that an employer who orders work to be performed
which is intrinsically dangerous in character or which is likely to
cause injury if proper care is not taken must see that necessary
precautions are taken to prevent injury, and liability cannot be
escaped for the negligent performance of such work by delegating
it to an independent contractor.
The second type of cases deal with the delegability of the manufacturer's duty to warn as to the safe use of his product." This

Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), and applies the rule of liability
laid down in the former case, that privity of contract is not necessary for
warranty liability (because it is imposed by law, not assumed by agreement),
to a hypothetical situation similar to our first line of cases. For a thorough
discussion of the topic of strict liability see Prosser, The Assualt Upon the
Citadel, 69 YAr L.J. 1099 (1960).
8 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
9291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
10 136 W. Va. 761, 68 S.E.2d 452 (1951).
,1 It must be noted that when one produces an inherently dangerous
product, i.e., a product dangerous in itself, which requires instructions as to
its use, either because of danger which is latent or because of its very
nature, Tomae v. A. P. DeSanno & Son, Inc., 209 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954);
Martin v. Bengue Inc. 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957), mere instructions as to use are likely to be insufficient to relieve the manufacturer's
duty to the public. Instructions for use, which merely tell how to use the
product, saying nothing about the danger of foreseeable misuses do not
necessarily satisfy the duty to warn, McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances
Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407, 181 N.E.2d 430 (1962) and McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712
(1953). For a discussion of the duty to warn "in use ' as well as giving
directions "for use" see Dillard and Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use
and the Duty to Warn, 4 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955). The extent to which this
rule is applied was expressed in Tampa Drug Vo. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla.
1958), where the court said "implicit in the duty to warn is the duty to warn
with a degree of intensity tat would cause a reasonable man to exercise for
his own safety the caution commensurate with the potential danger." Id. at 609.
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duty, like the duty to inspect, is probably not delegable because
of the nature of the product. The Restatement of Torts supports
this contention by providing that:
The manufacturer of a chattel which he knows or has reason
to know to be, or to be likely to be dangerous, for use is
subject to the liability of a supplier of chattels with such
knowledge."2

One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel
for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the
supplier would expect to use the chattel . . if the supplier
*

. .

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of

its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to
be dangerous.1 3
The comment following the latter section points out that when the
degree of danger is great the manufacturer or supplier cannot rely
on a third person to give the necessary warnings. If the third
person fails to give to those whom the supplier would expect to
use the product the warnings requested, the manufacturer or
supplier will be liable, since the degree of caution taken would not
be commensurate with the magnitude of the risk involved.
The case of Clement v. Crosby & Co. 4 applied this rule where
the retailer, having full knowledge of the product's dangerous propensities, sold stove polish manufactured by the defendant but did
not warn the customer. The court, in holding that the manufacturer
was liable for injuries resulting from the combustion of the polish,
said, "it would be no defense to the manufacturer, even if the
retailer had full knowledge of the dangerous nature of the article,
and sold it without warning."1 5 More recent cases in accord with
this holding are Farley v. Standard Pyroxoloid Corp. 6 and Martin
v. Bengue, Inc.' both of which held that the manufacturer of
inherently dangerous products should foresee that their dealer might
fail to disclose the dangerous characteristics of the product and
so must be liable in event of such happening.
12

ToRTs § 394 (1965).
14148 Mich. 293, 111 N.W. 745 (1907).
15 Id.at 295.
16 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930).
17 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
(SEcoND),
REsTATEN TEr
at § 388.
'31d.
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In conjunction with a discussion of this problem of the manufacturer delegating his duty to warn to the dealer, it is necessary
to mention the additional problem of the necessity of warnings
to remote users by a manufacturer. The authors of one article'"
suggest that if a supplier or manufacturer to a remote user gives an
adequate warning to his immediate vendee, he should be relieved
of liability unless he knows: (a) that the vendee will probably not
pass on the warning, (b) the probability of harm is extra-ordinary,
and (c) the actual user would not appreciate a usual warning
whether given by the manufacturer or the supplier.
In the case of Foster v. Ford Motor Co.'9 a tractor which was
manufactured by the defendant and driven by the owner's employee
tipped over backwards when attempts were made to extricate it
after becoming mired. The court held that the manufacturer was
not liable for failing to give the employee notice of the danger
since adequate instructions had been given previously to the
employer. The court stated that "the manufacturer who puts out
an article with notice to the purchaser of its limitations, restrictions,
or defects is not liable to third persons injured thereby ...."120
In the third type of case, involving the delegation of the duty to
install additional devices to preserve the safety of the consuming
public, some trouble might arise in initially establishing a duty owed
by the manufacturer. Obviously, without a duty owed there is no
problem of delegation. So, this necessitates an initial determination
of what the product in question is conceived to be. A product can
be defined either as an article which is able to achieve an end
result, i.e., a hot water heater which will heat water, or an article
which, in light of its function, is immediately ready to safely
perform that function. If the former definition is adopted there
would be no duty imposed on the manufacturer in this third type
of case, whereas, if the latter definition is adopted, a duty to
install the safety device would arise. In the principal case, if we
consider the combination temperature and pressure valve as part
of the product, due to its absolute necessity, then the duty to install
the valve arises, for without it the product would obviously be
'I Baylor & Grimit, Liability for Negligent Design of Inert Products: The
Duty to Warn, A.B.A. SECToN OF INSuRANcE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION

LAw 222 (1965).

,9
139 Wash. 341, 246 Pac. 945 (1926).
0

2 Id. at 348.
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defective. Even if the safety device is considered a part of the
installation process and not part of the product per se, a duty
arises to install the safety device when it is foreseeable that the
exact accessory might not be installed (possibly because the common installation practice is otherwise) and the dangerousness of
the consequences in such case is excessive.
It is suggested that the duty in this third type of case can be
delegated but only when the consumer is adequately warned
concerning the consequences in case of faulty installation and is
adequately instructed as to the proper method of installation or
use. This view is supported by the principal case and a case quite
similar to it, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc." In that case the
manufacturer of a hot water heater was not liable to a third person
who suffered injuries because of the faulty installation of the
water heater since the contractor who purchased it did not follow
the accompanying directions. The court said:
[T]he defect alleged by the plaintiffs arose not from the heating
unit as such but from the later installation which did not
include any mixing valve or other tempering device at the
boiler. [The manufacturer] had furnished suitable installation
instructions which 'strongly recommended that a mixing valve
be installed between the hot and cold domestic water lines.'
[The contractor] deliberately disregarded [the manufacturer's]
recommendation and decided upon its own design and installation .... It is evident.., that neither Levitt nor anyone else
placed any reliance on [the manufacturer's] judgment or skill
... ; that being so there would appear to be no sound bases for
invoking principles of implied warranty or strict liability
against [the manufacturer].22
Other than the fact that the manufacturer in the Schipper case
more strongly recommended the installation of the safety device
(which could have some bearing on whether adequate warning
was given) the cases seem to stand for the proposition that a
manufacturer's duty to the consuming public to make his product
additionally safe for use by the installation of safety devices can
be delegated to another if adequate warnings to the consumer are
given.
21
22

44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).

Id. at 97.
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It appears that the manufacturer of inherently dangerous products has a duty to protect the public from foreseeable injuries
due to the very nature of the product, the purposes for which the
product will be used or the necessity of additional safety devices
upon installation. This duty to warn, instruct or inspect is not
delegable to an intermediary party, but apparently the duty to
make one's product more safe by the installation of safety devices
is delegable through proper warnings and instructions to the
consumer.
PaulR. Rice
Torts--Discarding the Rule of Imputed Negligence in
Automobile Cases
P, while riding in an automobile driven by his servant within the
scope of employment, was injured when his automobile was struck
by another vehicle driven by D's servant. P's servant was contributorily negligent. D contended that the negligence of P's servant
should be imputed to P. Judgment in the lower court was in favor
of D. Held, reversed. The negligence of a servant involved in an
automobile accident in the scope of his employment should not be
imputed to his master, who was riding with him at the time, so as
to bar the master's right of recovery against a negligent third party.
Weber v. Stokley Van Camp, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1966).
This Minnesota decision represents a rejection of a widely, if
not universally, accepted principle that the negligence of a servant
will be imputed to his master in automobile cases when the master
would be vicariously liable.' The theory of imputed negligence is
said to have its origin 2 in an old English case3 in which the negligence of an omnibus driver was imputed to a passenger who was
struck and injured by another vehicle upon alighting from the
omnibus. The omnibus driver was negligent in permitting the
passenger to disembark in the middle of the street instead of at the
curb as was proper. In imputing his negligence to the passenger, the
court reasoned that the passenger was so identified with the driver
that she must be precluded from recovering against the negligent
driver of the other vehicle.
E.g., Hightower v. Landnim, 109 Ga. App. 510, 136 S.E.2d 425 (1964);
Divita v. Atlantic Trucking Co., 129 W. Va. 264, 40 S.E. 324 (1946).
2 Lessler, TnE PnoposwD DiscARD or r=n DocTwRNE oF IMWUTED CONTRIUroRY NEGLIGENCE, 20 Fordham L. Reo. 156 (1951).
3Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849).
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